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Skyrocketing fuel prices have stressed the Department of Defense’s budget in 
recent years.  In 2001 the DoD spent $4.7 Billion on fuel with the Air Force consuming $ 
2.7 Billion (GAO, 2001).  These figures have grown over due to these increases as well 
as the increased flying ours to support the Global War On Terror.  In fact, the Fiscal Year 
2007 budget has already been increased by $1.1 billion, or 1% of the total budget, to 
accommodate the increased price of fuel (SAF/FMB, 2006).    Current forecasts of this 
resource have yielded poor results, impairing the DoD's ability to budget this critical 
expense.  Further because the forecast are poor, strategic hedging strategies cannot be 
effectively employed.  Because fuel is a significant portion of aircraft operations and 
maintenance cost it should be considered in the acquisition of new systems, but the 
current forecast have not provided the accurate data required. 
 
  Current forecast available to the DOD were examined, and compared to two 
econometric structural forecast models.  The performance of these structural models was 
then compared to the benchmark forecasts for energy provided by the Energy 
Information Agency.   A consensus price forecast was constructed from these alternative 
forecasts.  
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BUILDING A CONSENSUS FORECAST TO PREDICT FUTURE CRUDE OIL 
PRICES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Overview/Background 
 
 Petroleum and its products are vital to maintaining a vibrant modern 
economy.  It is a factor in virtually every aspect of production, with far-reaching impact 
in not only business but also in the personal lives of consumers.  The price of oil plays a 
role in the selection of which car we buy, what trips we can afford to make, as well as 
playing a vital role in many business decisions.  Currently, the Energy Information 
Agency (EIA) forecasts U.S. demand for crude oil to increase from 15.6 million barrels 
per day (mb/d) in 2005 to 18.1 mb/d in 2030 (AEO, 2006).  Clearly oil is important to our 
economic security. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) is a major consumer of petroleum in the 
United States.  The DoD fuel sales totaled $4.7 billion in fiscal year 2001, with the Air 
Force consuming approximately $2.7 billion in fuel.  This means the price of fuel is an 
important budgetary concern for the DoD, and critical to our national security. 
The United States Air Force, as it builds a strategy to provide for the protection of 
the United States and its interests, will continue to assess not only today’s price for fuel 
but also future prices.  This is especially true as it makes decisions in three areas of 
concern:  acquisition, budgeting, and hedging strategies in the purchase of petroleum 




The volatility in crude oil prices has had a profound impact in every aspect of the 
American economy.  This has resulted in difficulty in preparing long-term budgets and 
planning.  Decisions such as hedging against future fuel prices are also heavily reliant on 
accurate forecasts.  The DoD has not been exempt from these problems, but has faced 
additional complications as it transitions the fighting force to protect the U.S. against 
modern threats, and as it fights the Global War On Terror. 
Research Question 
  This thesis seeks to answer the following research question: 
How can the USAF better predict long-term fuel prices to enhance the transformation of 
the forces to face modern threats, improve financial planning and improve logistics 
planning?   
To answer this question the following investigative questions will be addressed: 
1.  What forecasts have historically been most accurate at predicting fuel prices? 
2.  What variables can be used in a reduced form forecast to improve forecast reliability? 
3.   How can the most accurate forecast be combined into a consensus forecast? 
4.  Will a parsimonious and theoretically simple model out perform more heavily 
parameterized models? 
Scope and limitations 
 The scope of this thesis is limited to forecasting crude oil.  While many factors 
are used to construct a forecast of this nature, factors other than the price of oil will not 
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be forecasted where reasonable forecast exits.  This includes production quantities, prices 
for substitutes and oil products and the economy.   
Thesis Outline 
 This thesis will review all applicable literature associated with forecasting crude 
oil as well as the statistical tools used to analyze the forecasts in Chapter II.  Chapter III 
will explain the methodology used to conduct this research.  The results will be discussed 
in chapter IV.  Finally, Chapter V will summarize the first three chapters and findings 
from the research.  Additionally, Chapter V will discuss the conclusions and make 





II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This chapter begins with a review of the history of crude oil production beginning 
in the 1930s.  It goes on to address the concerns about incipient supply constraints.  This 
is followed by an explanation of the statistical tools used to evaluate forecast accuracy 
and concludes with an explanation of forecasting methods and models used to forecast oil 
prices. 
Oil History 
 The history of oil production since the 1930s can be divided into two time 
periods:  early expansion, and the post 1973-1974 oil embargo.  Before the embargo, oil 
prices were very stable, and had a notable albeit modest downward trend.  Since the 
embargo, prices have been subject to several shocks that have caused a great deal of 






















 During the early years the world enjoyed stable oil prices and rapid expansion in 
demand; however, the seeds that eventually became the volatile oil prices of today were 
sown during that time.  During this time most of the growth in demand was met by 
production in the Middle East (Cremer, 1991).  As the world became dependant on cheap 
oil found in the Middle East, the underlying market was changing.    
 Initially the oil markets were dominated by a few big oil companies, or “majors,” 
which enjoyed large profits and little serious competition.  As a result, an oligopoly was 
formed and prices were controlled largely by informal agreements.   Unfortunately, this 
left the governments of the oil-producing nations out in the cold.  The rents they received 
for the oil extracted in their countries were largely dictated to them, and they had little 
control over their fate.  But, the large profit margins invited a swarm of independent oil 
companies to invade the market, offering better terms to the governments in an effort to 
break into the market (Cremer, 1991). 
 During this time, Middle Eastern countries received a royalty on the oil produced 
within their borders.  This meant that government revenues were tied to volume, 
regardless of price (Cremer, 1991).  But in the 1950s the oil companies began to share the 
profits and risk of the oil markets with the governments of oil producing nations.  This 
was not an easy task given that the oil companies were large, vertically integrated firms 
and the spot markets a small share of production.  As a result the agreement was that the 
“posted price,” a simplified calculation of the oil sold in different markets around the 
world, would be used.  Under this new agreement government revenues were still tied to 
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production, but price was becoming a more important consideration in determining levels 
of production (Cremer, 1991). 
Formation of OPEC 
Increased competition caused the oil companies to cut market prices in the late 
1950s.  The reduction in government revenues prompted five oil-producing nations to 
form the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Cremer, 1991).  The 
original members of this fledgling cartel were: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and 
Venezuela.  Since that time the membership has grown, and today the eleven member 
countries produce about 40 percent of the world’s oil (EIA IPM Appendix A). 
 Initially, OPEC failed to reverse the trend in the market price for oil.  Prices fell 
throughout the 1960s to an all time low on 1969. Throughout this time the big oil 
companies held the production reins (Cremer, 1991).  At least one prominent analyst 
believes the amazing demand growth for OPEC oil, 10 percent annually, was technically 
unsustainable (Gately, 1995).  Leading this demand growth were surging European and 
Japanese markets and a peaking U.S. market (Cremer, 1991). 
 However in early 1970s, OPEC nations began to exert pressure on the oil 
companies.  During this time the governments became partial owners of the operating 
companies that, until then, had been owned by foreign multinationals (Cremer, 1991).  
OPEC’s ability to control oil production was growing and the stage was set for a new era 
in the oil markets.  
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1973 Oil Embargo 
 In October 1973, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the other OPEC nations 
changed the world forever when Faisal waved his “Oil Sword” in response to the US 
support of Israel following an unprovoked attack by Egypt during the Yom Kippur War 
(Simmons, 2005).  Faisel enacted an embargo on all oil shipments from Saudi Arabia to 
the US and the Netherlands.  This coupled with the reduction in oil production caused a 
sharp spike in oil prices that was not fully felt until 1974, when OPEC raised the price of 
oil to over $11 (Simmons, 2005; Cremer, 1991).  While the embargo was lifted in March 
1974, OPEC had realized its control of oil prices and the enormity of its potential 
revenues.  In 1973 OPEC generated about $137 billion in oil revenues.  But as a result of 
the increased prices OPEC generated over $410 billion in oil revenues while reducing its 
production by about 300,000 barrels per day (Cremer, 1991). 
In the US, the price effects of the embargo were exacerbated by President Nixon’s 
price control program.  This program limited fuel price increases in an effort to mitigate 
soaring inflation, which began in March 1973.  It was during this time that the US called 
for voluntary rationing, banned sales of gasoline on Sundays and approved the Trans-
Alaskan oil pipeline designed to carry 2 million barrels per day.  At that time, the US 
consumed about 6 trillion barrels of crude oil daily (Trumbore, 1999). 
Following the Oil Embargo, prices remained high and demand for OPEC oil grew 
only slightly (Gately, 1995).  It was during this time that many OPEC countries began to 
cut production, seemingly unilaterally and without expectation of other member nations 
reciprocating.  Saudi Arabia announced that it would limit production to 8.5 mb/d, a 
dramatic reversal of the previous goal of 20 mb/d before the embargo (Cremer, 1991). 
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1980 Price Spike  
The 1978 Iranian revolution also had a dramatic impact on global oil production 
(Gately, 1995).  As part of the revolution, the oil workers went on strike in the fall of 
1979.  By December Iranian oil stopped flowing (Cremer, 1991).  This resulted in the 
landed price of oil from the region to increase from $13.85/barrel in 1977 (nominal $) to 
$20.42/barrel in 1979 (AER, 2005, T5.19).  The strike ended in the spring of 1979 but 
production was only at slightly over 50 percent of the pre-revolutionary rates.  Before the 
revolution, Iran produced 20 percent of OPEC’s total production, at a rate of about 5.6 
mb/d.  After the revolution, Iranian production fell to 3.1 mb/d in 1979 (Cremer, 1991). 
OPEC’s lack of responsiveness coupled with consumers stockpiling oil caused 
prices to continue to drift upwards following this price shock (Gately, 1995).  OPEC 
voted to raise the ceiling on oil prices, but they lacked a unified vision for the price 
structure.  While the official ceiling was $23.50, Saudi Arabia held to a much lower 
$18/barrel.  The spot price continued to rise, and efforts to unify OPEC’s position failed 
until 1981 (Cremer, 1991). 
 Finally, in September 1980, Iraq attacked Iran and occupied much of its oil 
producing region.  This bitter conflict lasted until 1988 and reduced oil production from 
two of OPEC’s largest producers.  Iranian production dropped from 3.1 mb/d in 1979 to 
only 1.3 mb/d in 1981 and Iraq dropped from 3.4 mb/d in 1979 to 1 mb/d in 1981.  While 
Iranian production did increase in 1982, it was not until after the war that it regained 
production to over 3 mb/d.  Iraq, on the other hand, has not seen production over 2.6 
mb/d since that time (AER, 2005, T4.1a). 
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In 1981 OPEC made yet another attempt to gain control of oil prices, with Saudi 
Arabia raising its price to $34.  Additionally, OPEC cut production in an attempt to keep 
prices elevated and set specific differentials for the various grades of crude oil.  But this 
ended when British National Oil Company (BNOC) cut the price of North Sea oil.  
Nigeria responded by cutting its price unilaterally.  This caused the cartel agreement to 
collapse (Cremer, 1991). 
With this breakdown in price controls OPEC tried to gain control of the 
production in member countries in March 1982.  This is significant because it is the first 
time OPEC behaved like a textbook cartel.  But this met with little success and by the end 
of 1982 the production limits set by mutual agreement were being exceeded by some 2 
mb/d.  This caused a glut in the oil market.  In February 1983 BNOC cut the price of 
North Sea oil; Nigeria responded by undercutting BNOC’s price (Cremer, 1991).   
Throughout this time frame Saudi Arabia was the swing producer, adjusting 
production to keep a stable price.  As such they had no production quota, but matched the 
market demand at the set price.  The difference between the OPEC’s target total 
production and the quotas for all other members was 7 mb/d, and that was assumed to be 
Saudi Arabia’s production quota.  This meant that the kingdom would need to absorb 
increases in non-OPEC production, and the resumption of exports from Iran and Iraq.  It 
also meant that they would need to compensate for any cheating in OPEC nations.  This 
led Saudi Arabia to cut production year after year.  Even still, the price of oil fell steadily 
until in October 1984 Saudi Arabia was finally given a quota.  But this was not enough to 
keep prices elevated.  Additionally, several countries were over-producing, causing Saudi 
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Arabian production to fall to 2 mb/d in the summer of 1985.  This was 8 mb/d below 
1981 production rates, and Saudi Arabia had been pushed to the limit (Cremer, 1991). 
Price collapse 1985 
 Pressed with falling oil prices and declining production, King Fahd of Saudi 
Arabia issued an ultimatum:  Saudi Arabia would claim its share of OPEC production.  If 
the members of OPEC did not cut production prices would fall.  Fortunately for the rest 
of the world, prices fell.  The nominal price of Saudi Arabian Light Sweet Crude in 1985 
was $29 per barrel; by 1989 the price had fallen to $13.15.  And OPEC’s last great push 
to inflate oil prices had died (Cremer, 1991). 
DESERT STORM 
In August 1992 Iraq once again turned on one of its neighbors, this time the much 
smaller and weaker Kuwait.  This prompted an immediate reaction from the international 
community.  An embargo was placed on Iraqi oil exports, cutting off a significant portion 
of the gulf region’s potential exports (Simmons, 2005).  As a result Iraqi production 
dropped from 2.8 mb/d to about 300 tb/d and Kuwaiti production dropped from 1.7 mb/d 
to 190 tb/d (AER, 2005, t4.1a)! 
The loss of production from both Iraq and Kuwait initially caused oil prices to 
soar.  But Saudi Arabia moved quickly to increase its production from about 5.3 mb/d 
before the invasion to more than 8 mb/d.  The speed at which Saudi Arabia did this 
illustrated the existing excess capacity.  But there is some concern over the effect such 
high production had on the giant oil fields (Simmons, 2005). 
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OPEC: Trouble in Paradise? 
 The 2005 EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook has forecasted OPEC to increase 
production from about 30.2 mb/d in 2002 to over 50.3 mb/d in 2025, with most of the 
growth, 17.6 mb/d, coming from the Middle East.  This is crucial if the global production 
of crude oil is to grow from 76.6 mb/d to over 114 mb/d in 2025 (AEO, 2005).  Without 
this production growth from the Middle East, it has been argued, the price of oil will 
grow rapidly. 
 This very aggressive prediction may prove difficult to attain.  In his book Twilight 
in the Desert, Matthew Simmons outlined three reasons OPEC in general and Saudi 
Arabia in particular may not be able to increase production to these unprecedented levels: 
political, industrial, and limited reserve levels.  While the focus of his work was on Saudi 
Arabia’s reserve levels, he did provide some interesting insights on the other reasons. 
 Saudi Arabia is a nation forged in war, and initially comprised largely of nomadic 
peoples sparsely populated over the vast deserts. Over the last half-century the population 
has exploded and the nomadic herdsmen have settled in cities.  In 1980 Saudi Arabia’s 
population was 9.4 million, but by 2003 the population had grown to 24.2 million 
(Simmons, 2005).  Put another way, Saudi Arabia’s population grew by 158 percent 
while the world population grew by about 43 percent.  At the same time the nation’s GDP 
has only grown by about 41 percent, with most of this growth occurring after 1990.  As 
of 2003 Saudi Arabia’s per capita income was only $8,400.  This places their per capita 
income at 46th in the world (EIA IEA 03 tb.2c).      
While Saudi Arabia has strong petroleum and petrochemical industries, it has 
little other employment opportunities.  These industries cannot fully employ the nation’s 
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population, leading to rampant unemployment.  The government needs to greatly 
subsidize many staples necessary for modern life such as like water, health care, gasoline, 
and electricity.  As the population grows a greater strain is placed on the governments 
already stretched budget.  The government is already examining expenditure reductions 
(Simmons, 2005). 
The second reason Saudi Arabia may not be able to increase its production as 
rapidly as the EIA forecast suggests is industrial constraints.  In 1980 Saudi Arabia’s 
production of crude oil averaged 9.9 mb/d.  Over the next several years this rate fell until 
in August 1985 oil production was at 2.3 mb/d.  Since then production has increased 
steadily, and in 2005 production averaged between 9.5 and 9.6 mb/d.  The marginal cost 
of increasing production during those years most likely would have been much smaller 
than in the coming years as much of the infrastructure needed to produce, store and 
distribute oil existed.   This hypothesis is very testable, but much of the information 
needed directly to test this are considered a state secret (Simmons, 2005). 
Most of Simmons’ text dealt with the heath of the giant oil fields, and his belief 
that these fields are in the twilight of their lives.  In general he states that years of 
overproduction have dramatically shortened the productive life of the mainstay of Saudi 
oil, and in the near future the oil from the kingdom will stop flowing.  Again this 
hypothesis is testable, but much of the primary data is not available.  This leaves 
researchers to examine the limited reports available from the kingdom (Simmons, 2005). 
The Scarcity of Oil 
 Most people believe that there is only a finite amount of oil on Earth (Cremer, 
1991).  As a result, prognosticators have predicted the total depletion of the world’s oil 
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supply for a long time.  Fortunately, these luminaries have been almost universally wrong 
in there assertions, often with magnificent orders of magnitude!  Potentially this could 
play a significant role in modeling the globe’s energy, depending on the time horizon for 
this to occur.  Several obstacles make determining the exact reserves remaining difficult, 
if not impossible.  First is the paradox observed by Adelman (1972).  The Persian Gulf 
had 42 billion barrels in proven reserves in 1950, by 1971 the reserves had grown to 367 
billion barrels, and in 1988 the region had 552 billion barrels. Between 1950 and 1971 
some 47 billion barrels of oil were extracted, and 98 billion barrels were extracted 
between 1971 and 1988.  This can be explained three ways: as oil prices increase 
economically feasible extraction of oil also increases; the technology to extract oil has 
improved; and not all reserves in the world are known (Cremer, 1991). 
Formal Forecasting of Petroleum Prices and Output 
 This section begins with a discussion on econometric forecasting and of the types 
of forecasting models in use today.  It then moves to a discussion of the application of 
some of these types of models.  It then outlines some of the mathematical tools used in 
forecasting, and concludes with a discussion of consensus forecasting. 
Econometric Forecasting 
 Econometric forecasting makes extensive use of regression analysis to build 
causal models to predict the future.  One of the earliest models of this form was built by 
Charles Sarle in 1925.  In his paper, Sarle forecasted the price of hog with reasonable 
accuracy, and won a Babson Prize for his efforts.  Unfortunately, this work was 
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discounted and few such models followed for many years.  In the 1950s, the work re-
emerged and has since gained popularity (Allen, 2001). 
 Because there is a large range of choices as to the variables selected, the form of 
the model and even the number of equations included, there is not one single overarching 
strategy to build a model.  As with all forecasting, the goal should be a model that is as 
simple as possible.  It should only be as complex as necessary to achieve accurate results.  
Frequently, though, models prove effective in sample but provide poor forecasting out of 
sample.  One of the chief reasons for this is reliance of forecasted values.  An 
independent variable should only be used when its value is known or can reasonably 
forecasted (Allen, 2001). 
Forecasting Models 
 
 Oil pricing models primarily fall into one of two paradigms: intertemporal 
optimization and behavior simulation.  Each of these has distinct strengths and 
weaknesses. 
The intertemporal optimization has its roots from Hotelling’s model of depletable 
natural resources and has dominated the theoretical literature without finding much in the 
way of practical use (Powell, 1990; Gately, 1995).  This method has three assumptions:  
the owner has perfect knowledge, perfect foresight, and the owner will seek to maximize 
net return on the investment.  The rent – or price less marginal cost of production – on 
the resource is discounted as the time moves toward the horizon, and the return on 
investment is the sum of the discounted rents.  This provides the modeler with a 
representation of the intertemporal equilibria for the agents (Powell, 1990).   
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This type of modeling has the distinct advantage of offering an economically 
rational explanation of the actors in the model.  But, it has some very serious drawbacks.  
First, perfect foresight and knowledge are highly unrealistic.  For this to happen oil 
producers would need to know and understand the exact level of world reserves, the rate 
of technological developments for extracting and distributing oil, current and future 
demand for oil and the correct discount rate.  These models also tend to be sensitive to 
price and the discount rate, as well as the availability and pricing of substitutes (Powell, 
1990).  This means that the models are only useful if a narrow set of assumptions are met 
(Gately 1995).  These models also do not incorporate non-economic variables into the 
model very well.  This means that objectives other than financial returns cannot be 
incorporated in the model.  Finally, these models do not explain how the market moves 
from disequilibrium to equilibrium (Powell, 2005). 
The second major type of oil model is the behavior simulation model.  This 
paradigm incorporates System Dynamics and the bounded rationality schools of thought 
into a single class of models.  As a result, these models embrace the uncertainty of the 
market and move from disequilibrium to disequilibrium much like a clock pendulum.  To 
do this the model uses heuristic rules imposed by decision-makers.  This produces sub-
optimal results for the producers, but the users of this type of modeling see that as a 
strength rather than a weakness.  Additionally, this model is solved recursively, 
beginning with the current prices.  This means they can illustrate how the market may 




This type of model has been criticized for three reasons:  the statistical 
relationship deteriorated after 1985, it requires the production capacity path be assumed 
and it is inappropriate to assume the capacity path independent of the price path.  
Nevertheless, this type of model is used by the National Energy Modeling System 
(NEMS) to forecast international oil prices (Powell, 1990). 
Elasticity Simulation Model 
 Dermot Gately defined a simulation model based on the elasticity of supply and 
demand for oil in 1995.  This model ties in OPEC production growth and the growth of 
world income together.  By varying OPEC production as a ratio of world income growth 
various price paths could be examined.  In particular Gately examined three scenarios: 
OPEC production growing half has fast as world income, OPEC production growing as 
fast as world income and OPEC production growing twice as fast as world income.  For 
each of these scenarios he presents an optimistic, reference and pessimistic case from 
OPEC’s point of view (Gately, 1995).   
 This model was updated in 2001 to test the economic incentives for OPEC to 
increase production at the rate required to meet the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
and EIA production forecasts.  This new model tested the effects of OPEC production 
growth at a flat rate through 2020.  The rate of production was varied from 1 percent to 4 
percent annually, and the resulting discounted oil revenues were compared.  Based on his 
simulations, OPEC would likely receive the greatest discounted earnings by increasing 
production at a rate of no more than 2 percent per year (Gately, 2001). 
 Gately has also extended this analysis in a pending article in the Energy Journal.  
In this article he examined the effects on OPEC’s revenues based on OPEC increasing to 
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capture a larger share of global oil market, maintain its share of the oil market, or 
decrease production growth and accept a small portion of the world oil production.  He 
also examined the effects of potential for disunity within OPEC.  To test these effects he 
divided OPEC into two groups:  Core and Non-Core members.  The Core members were 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emigrants (UAE).  Different production paths 
were then examined for both groups and the relative income from each path compared 
(Gately, 2003).   
He concluded that production increasing OPEC’s share of the world’s oil 
production result in a lower payoff for OPEC’s members.  In regard to the disunity 
among OPEC members he found that they were in a zero sum game.  If either group 
could be certain that the other would increase production slowly, a fast increase in 
production would be profitable for that group.   But if either group does increase 
production at a faster pace, the other will likely move to match that pace.  As a result, he 
believes that the incentive is to increase production at a slower pace (Gately, 2003).  Of 
course, this does not consider a scenario in which a group cannot increase production for 
some reason.   
Target Capacity Utilization Model (TCU) 
 The TCU model has become the dominant simulation model.  The TCU model 
has two basic assumptions:  OPEC is the residual supplier of oil on the global market, 
and it bases the price of oil on targeted production capacity (Powell, 1990).  Since 1980 
many examples can be seen where OPEC, or members of OPEC, have acted as the swing 
(or residual) producer.  During the early 1980s Saudi Arabia continuously cut production 
in an effort to inflate prices. Also, in August 1990 Saudi Arabia increased production to 
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stabilize prices on the world oil market when Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil production stopped.  
Additionally, OPEC has acted several times during that timeframe to set oil prices or 
OPEC production or both (Simons, 2004).  These assumptions seem plausible.  This type 
of model was used in seven of ten models in the 1982 Energy Modeling Forum, and has 
been used the EIA forecast as recently as 1985 (Powell, 1990; Gately, 1995).   
 To initiate this type of model, a set of rules are assumed to change oil prices 
based on OPEC production capacity utilization.  In one of the earliest models of this type, 
Gately, Kyle and Fischer set the rules to decrease the price by 5 percent, unless 
utilization was below 75 percent and last year’s production was less than two years ago, 
or utilization is above 85 percent and last year’s levels exceeded production two years 
ago.  In the former case prices would be dropped by 20 percent, and in the latter case 
prices would be raised 15 percent (Gately, 1977).  But while the discounted net present 
value might show what would be the best set of rules for OPEC to use, it says nothing 
about what rules they will use in the future (Powell, 1990).   
 Models of this type have come under sharp criticism.  In 1990 Stephen Powell 
tested this form of model extensively.  With respect to the price change relationship to 
capacity utilization he found that the markets did not follow the EIA projection from 
1984 to 1990, and the relationship depended heavily on one’s interpretation of capacity.  
The results varied significantly based on this interpretation.  Further, when the model was 
placed in a simulation the resulting fluctuations had no relationship to a profit-
maximizing outcome.  Powell did acknowledge that there are many reasons to model 
energy and without knowledge of exactly how it would be used any crititque would be 
limited (Powell, 1990). 
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National Energy Modeling System 
The Department of Energy’s Energy Information Agency administers the 
National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) “to project the energy, economic, 
environmental, and security impacts on the United States of alternative energy policies 
and of different assumptions about energy markets.”  This model used a modular 
structure that enables different segments of the US economy to the evaluated, along with 
the interaction these segments have with each other.  As such this model forecast much 
more than just the price of crude oil (EIA, 2003).   Figure 2-2 displays an overview of 
NEMS. 
 




According the NEMS 2003 overview, 
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 “NEMS represents the behavior of energy markets and their 
interactions with the U.S. economy. The model achieves a supply/demand 
balance in the end-use demand regions, defined as the nine Census divisions, by 
solving for the prices of each energy product that will balance the quantities 
producers are willing to supply with the quantities consumers wish to consume. 
The system reflects market economics, industry structure, and existing energy 
policies and regulations that influence market behavior.” (EIA, 2003) 
 
The price of crude oil is forecasted in the International Energy Module.  This 
module is of greatest interest to this research.  Table 2-1 list all the inputs and outputs of 
this module.  The price of crude oil is an input to all modules, and therefore is critical to 
all forecast in NEMS.  But, as Table 2-1 illustrates, this module relies on inputs from 
other modules in NEMS.  One of the assumptions for this module is that OPEC will 
increase production to meet global demand.  This means that the different forecasted 
price paths are a result of varying production growth from OPEC.  However, this module 
also has the ability to forecast OPEC production given a price path as well.  (EIA, 2003) 
Table 2-1 International Energy Model Inputs/Outputs (EIA, 2003) 
IEM Outputs  Inputs from NEMS  Exogenous Inputs  
World oil price 
Crude oil import supply curves 
Refined product import supply curves 
Oxygenate import supply curves  
Domestic crude oil production 
Domestic natural gas liquids production
Domestic gas-to-liquids production 
Domestic coal-to-liquids production 
Domestic other liquids production 
Domestic refinery gain 
Domestic product supplied 
GDP price deflators 
Domestic crude oil imports 
Domestic refined product imports 
Domestic oxygenate imports 
Domestic unfinished oils imports  
OPEC production capacity path 
Reference non-U.S. oil supply and 
demand   
Non-U.S. economic parameters 
Base import supply curves for crude 
oils, refined products, and oxygenates 
 
Ultimately, the world oil price is derived in part from inputs provided by other 
modules that in turn rely on the world oil price as an input.  This requires the system to 
cycle through many iterations before the model settles on a forecast.  This poses a 
problem if any of the underlying assumptions or exogenous inputs is incorrect, but this is 
true for any model.  OPEC’s production of crude oil is an exogenous input to the model, 
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so it is critical to the model and subject to scrutiny.  If OPEC fails to meet the production 
forecast input to this module, whether by design or not, the forecast accuracy will be 
negatively affected.  Further, it can easily be argued that oil prices will effect OPEC 
production, but these are an exogenous input to the model (EIA, 2003). 
Forecasting tools 
 Forecast performance can be measured in a variety of ways including: Mean 
Error, Mean Absolute Error, Mean Percentage Error, Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
(MAPE), and Mean Squared Error (MSE).  Each of these measurements has their own 
strengths and weaknesses.  Mean Error and Mean Percentage Error both use the raw error 
in the calculation error.  As a result, they consider both the positive and negative errors 
and the result is most likely a much smaller error and most forecasters do not use these as 
the primary measurement of error.   
 MAPE is mean of the Absolute Percentage Error (APE) for each forecasted 







 This has the advantage of showing the relative size of the error as a percentage of time 
series data.  This enables a comparison across multiple sets of data that may not have the 
same relative values.  But for MAPE to have any meaning, the scale of the underlying 
data must have meaning.  Additionally, MAPE can only be calculated if the actual values 
being forecasted cannot be equal to zero.  MSE on the other hand does not provide any 





A consensus forecast uses several forecasts to build a more accurate prediction.  
This enables forecasts that use different methodologies and assumptions, and consider 
different factors to be combined giving a more comprehensive end product.  The real 
challenge in building a consensus forecast is deciding which forecasts to included, and 
their associated weights.  This requires the performance of each forecast to be measured 
and compared.  Forecasts with robust performance are given more weight than those with 
lesser accuracy. 
Summary 
 Obviously, a great deal goes into forecasting petroleum prices.  Over the last 65 
years several events have influenced the price of oil, often without warning or precedent. 
Further, the interplay between oil prices and other aspects of our economy make 
pinpointing a price difficult.  Many complex, often intractable models have been built to 
forecast this precious commodity – with meager results.  This limits their use within the 






 This chapter outlines the data employed by this study followed by an explanation 
of how the most predictive variables were selected.   Then goes on to address three 
forecasting models:  an ARMA 4,4, and two reduced form models.  It concludes with an 
explanation of how these forecasts along with the major forecasts were evaluated.     
Data Selection 
 Reliable data is needed to build a strong forecast, and energy forecasting is no 
exception.  The data selected all have a relationship with petroleum supply or demand.  
These relationships are explained more fully later in the thesis.  Most data are obtained 
from the Energy Information Agency (EIA). 
 This study uses the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Deflator to state all monetary 
data in real terms.  A GDP deflator adjusts the GDP to remove that portion of the 
increase in GDP from inflation leaving only real growth.  
Forecasting Methods 
 There are several methods to forecast the price of crude oil over the long term 
ranging from simple smoothing techniques to the complex models used by the US 
Department of Energy (DOE).  Further, the variables used can also range greatly.  This 
creates a very large pool of potential forecasts.  Fortunately, many of the simple methods 
are not well suited to forecasting over a long period of time, and more methods can be 
eliminated because the data in this case is annual and does not require any special 
treatment for seasonality. For the purpose of creating the forecast as part of this study, 
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two basic forecasting methods were employed:  Autoregressive Moving Integrated 
Average (ARIMA) and Reduced Form Structural Model.  
Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average 
 ARIMA uses past values of the data being forecasted and the moving average of 
error to generate predictions about the future.  This type of forecast can be very accurate 
and can capture some of the natural fluctuations in the data but offers no explanation of 
why the dependent variable is changing.   
To prepare the ARIMA forecast the Box-Jenkins methodology was used.  This is 
a three-phase process: identification, estimation and testing, and finally application.  The 
identification phase has two steps:  data preparation and model selection.  During data 
preparation the time series is transformed to stabilize the variance in the data and 
differenced to obtain stationary data as necessary.  The estimation and testing phase also 
has two steps:  estimation and diagnostics.  During the estimation step the parameters of 
possible models are estimated and the best model is then selected using criteria such as 
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) or Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion 
(SBIC).  Then during the diagnostics step the residuals are analyzed to determine if they 
are White Noise.  White Noise is attributed to pure random chance and displays no 
predictable pattern.  If the residuals are not White Noise the modeler reverts back to step 
2 in the first phase.  Finally, in the third phase, Application, the model developed in the 




 A reduced form or structural equation model is a representation of the underlying 
supply and demand curves in a given market.  To do this the independent variables are 
selected to represent the supply and demand sides of the market, then applied in a 
regression equation to forecast what will happen in the market.  The three basic 
assumptions for regression – normality of residuals, independence of residuals, and 
constant variance – apply to this type of model.   
 Variables for this model were selected to represent changes in the underlying 
supply and demand.  I categorize these variables as: economic indicators, consumption, 
oil reserves, oil production, oil exploration and infrastructure, and current events.  A 
complete list of variables tested is included in Figure 3-1.  Before the variables were 
included in a regression equation, their predictive ability was tested and the correlation 
evaluated.  Variables with poor correlation were discarded in favor of more predictive 
variables.  Further, variables with p-values greater then 0.10 were also eliminated.  The 
p-values were relaxed from the normal 0.05 because multicollinearity can cause 
inefficient estimates. 
Consensus Forecast 
A consensus forecast is a linear combination of the forecasts used.  This is the 
same as a weighted average of the forecasts involved.  The weights for the forecasts are 


















where ie  is the absolute error.  By definition the sum of the weights is 1.0.  This 
provides the greatest weight to the forecast with the smallest mean error (Hammond, 




Economic Indicators High Low Average Standard Deviation
 GDP Deflator (First Difference) 5.08 0.18 1.63 1.2938 
 GDP (in 2000 chained dollars) 10755.7 2560 4150.2 1769.9 
 
Consumption  High Low Average Standard Deviation
 Economic Sector consumption     





                Transportation 7316602 2037208 4654141.2 1313080.6 
                Industrial 1950240 583251 1297207.2 353286.8 
                 Commercial 272284 121339 207758.7 39975.5 
                Residential 557548 204078 382493.3 101490.3 
 Global Population 6372.8 2555.4 3887.7 910.0 
 US Population 293655 165931 205789.5 31614.3 
 
Strategic Oil Reserves (SOR) High Low Average Standard Deviation
 Days in reserve     
 Percent SOR in Crude oil 70.4 2.1 48.34 20.15 
 Total Petroleum in SOR 41.1 0.6 24.95 12.81 
 
Global Oil Production High Low Average Standard Deviation
 OPEC Total 32922.3 17151 24922.3 4626.7 
 Global Total 68563.6 48986 61122.9 4878.7 
 
Oil Infrastructure and Exploration  High Low Average Standard Deviation
 US Oil Wells drilled 413112 99410 19795.5 69647.8 
Global Crude Oil Distillation 
Capacity 82258.3 47048.8 70942.9 9277.5 
Percentage of Crude oil Distillation 
Capacity Used 1.0412 0.7210 0.8708 0.0847 
 
Current Events*      
 War     
 OPEC Restrictive Policy     
 Supply Capacity constraint     
Constant Oil Price Policy (1949 to 1970) 
 
Time*      
* No lags were considered for this data 




This chapter begins by outlining the ARIMA model constructed to forecast crude 
oil.  It then goes on to outline the findings of the univariate analysis and outlining two 
reduced form models that perform well over the holdout set of variables.  Finally, a 
consensus model is constructed. 
Three forecast models were constructed; a naïve time series (ARMA) and two 
structural models.  The structural variables were chosen based on the univariate 
correlation with oil prices at the beginning of the chapter.  Additionally, the data was 
divided into two sets before any of the forecast models were built.  The first set, or 
initiation data set, consisted of all data prior to 1994.  This data was used to build the 
models.  The second set of data, the hold-out set, was used to evaluate the model’s 
predictive performance.   
ARIMA   
 The ARIMA model that yielded the best results was an ARMA (3,1).  This model 
produced an adjusted R2 of 0.7896 and an Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) of 
139.7489 , and can be represented as 1 2 3 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t tF AR AR AR MAθ β β β β− − − −= + + + +  
where AR is the autoregressive term and MA is the error term.  The coefficients, as well 




Table 4-1: ARMA 3, 1 Coefficients 
Term Lag Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
AR1 1 2.0366 0.1462 13.93 <.0001 
AR2 2 -1.2531 0.2830 -4.43 <.0001 
AR3 3 0.1973 0.1489 1.32 0.1927 
MA1 1 1.0000 0.0608 16.45 <.0001 
Intercept 0 18.8611 1.6921 11.15 <.0001 
 
 From the results of the t-tests it appears that the AR3 variable does not contribute 
any predictive properties to the model.  But an ARMA (2, 1) model has a lower adjusted 
R2 and the AIC is also greater, indicating a less predictive model.  Thus an ARMA (3, 1) 
was selected for this forecast. 
Predictive Variables 
 In order to build the simple structural models, I first evaluated the subsets of 
variables identified in figure 3-1.  Each variable was tested using various lags ranging 
from one to seven, as well as being plotted in an XY plot for evaluation of possible 
polynomial correlations.  This chapter presents the evaluation of each subset first, and 
then compares the most predictive variables from all subsets.    
Economic Indicators 
 The correlations of the most predictive lagged variables for the economic 
indicators tested are presented in table 4-1.  The XY plots for Real GDP, GDP Deflator, 
Population, and Real GDP per capita show little if any predictive properties regardless of 
lags taken.  Further, they do not appear to be suitable for fitting a least squares line 
through them, even using polynomial equations.   
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Both the first order difference for the population of the US lagged 7 years and the 
first order difference of the GDP deflator lagged one year showed better predictive 
properties when fitted using a 2nd order polynomial equation.  But the correlation 
between the change in population in the US and world oil prices is rather weak and fails 
the logic test.  How would a large population increase seven years ago drive prices down 
this year?  The GDP deflator has a very strong correlation.  This would be consistent with 
the inflation rate in one year, having a ripple effect on price changes in following years.  
 
Table 4-2: Economic Correlations   








Lag 4 (Diff) 
GDP Deflator 
Lag 1 
Price 1 0.3450 0.4001 0.3678 0.1578 0.7861 
Real GDP Lag 4 0.3450 1 0.9819 0.9970 0.3210 0.4898 
GDP Deflator 0.4001 0.9819 1 0.9840 0.2754 0.5361 
Real GDP per 
Capita Lag 4 0.3678 0.9970 0.9840 1 0.3234 0.5363 
Real GDP per 
Capita Lag 4 (Diff) 0.1578 0.3210 0.2754 0.3234 1 0.2195 
GDP Deflator Lag 





 The correlation between the consumption of the economic sectors and the price of 
oil all had a negative correlation though the strongest correlation for each sector was 
found at different lags.  In fact, the correlation between the first order difference of both 
oil consumption to generate electric power and industrial consumption were strongest 
without any lag.  As a result they are not good predictors for crude oil prices.  Further, 
there is a strong correlation between the first order difference of commercial 
consumption lagged two periods and the first order difference of residential lagged two 
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periods.  These factors result in a less predictive variable when combined.  And when the 
price of crude oil is regressed against these variables together the commercial variable 
does not contribute any significant predictive properties.  As a result the most predictive 
variable for this sub-set of variables is the first order difference of residential 
consumption lagged two periods with the first order difference of consumption for 
transportation lagged one period being a close second.  The best consumption data is 
presented in table 4-3. 
 Table 4-3: Consumption  






Lag 1 Electric Diff 
Commercial 
Diff lag 2 
Residential 
Diff Lag 2
Price 1 -0.3735 0.3404 -0.4951 -0.5939 -0.6099 -0.4222 -0.6856 
Population 
Diff Lag 7 -0.3735 1 -0.3805 0.1380 0.3267 0.3117 0.3624 0.3976 
World Pop 
Diff 0.3404 -0.3805 1 -0.0954 -0.1850 -0.0657 -0.3743 -0.3234 
Industrial 
Diff -0.4893 0.1380 -0.0775 1 0.3823 0.3641 0.03728 0.1929 
Trans Diff 
Lag 1 -0.5879 0.3267 -0.1204 0.3860 1 0.4781 0.3301 0.6243 
Electric Diff -0.6098 0.3117 -0.0657 0.3604 0.4648 1 0.1922 0.3365 
Commercial 
Diff lag 2 -0.4222 0.3624 -0.3743 0.03728 0.3448 0.1922 1 0.5618 
Residential 
Diff Lag 2 -0.6856 0.3976 -0.3234 0.1929 0.6268 0.3364 0.5618 1 
 
 
 The subset of variables was evaluated for a possible fit with a polynomial 
equation.  Some of the variables could best be fitted with a second order polynomial 
equation.  But the p-values from t-tests indicated that the variables were beginning to lose 
their predictive properties.  As a result it is not likely that the squares of these variables 
will be used in a final model. Thus more parsimonious forecast models were pursued 
rather than a more heavily parameterized version.  
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Strategic Oil Reserves (SOR) 
 The correlation between the SOR and price was strongest when only the change 
in the reserves was considered.  Not surprisingly, the total petroleum and the number of 
days in the SOR have the strongest correlation when the change occurs.  The strongest 
correlation for the percent crude appears to occur when it is lagged two periods.  All 
three of these variables predictive properties can be improved by using a second order 
polynomial equation.  But, in both the Number of days and the percent of crude oil in the 
SOR this is likely because of an overly influential data point or points.  This can be seen 
in figure 4-1 through 4-3.  Further the p-value for the t-tests for the total petroleum 
indicated that the predictive value for a polynomial equation is beginning to become less 
reliable.   
     Table 4-4:  U.S. Strategic Oil Reserves 





Price 1 0.6911 0.7071 0.6506 
Total Pet Diff 0.6888 1 0.7644 0.3441 
SOR Days Diff 0.7100 0.7649 1 0.4037 
Percent Crude in 
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Global Oil Production 
 Using oil production as a predictive variable has yielded disappointing results.  
Up until about 1994, the change in production of oil has had a negative correlation with 
the price of oil.  This is shown in figures 4-4 through 4-6. But in the last several years 
that relationship seams to have shifted to a positive correlation, as seen in figures 4-7 
through 4-9.   Likely, this is the result of changing policies in OPEC and other underlying 


















-0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0 .01 .02 .03
% OPEC Diff 














-4000 -2000 0 1000 2000 300040005000
Global Production Diff
 
Figure 4-4: Oil Price by Percent OPEC Figure 4-5: Oil Price by Global Production  
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Figure 4-6: Oil Price by OPEC Production Figure 4-7: Price by Percent OPEC  
       Growth          Annual Change 
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Figure 4-8: Oil Price by Global Production    Figure 4-9: Oil Price by OPEC Production  




Oil Infrastructure and Exploration   
 The best correlation in this subset by far is the number of wells drilled, but this 
variable is not lagged.  The reason for this correlation is best explained when the number 
of wells drilled is a function of the price of oil rather than the price of oil is a function of 
drilling for oil.  This is a classic structural model consideration which has been avoided 
in this research. 
 Refinery utilization, like oil production, is rather problematic.  Figure 4-10 
illustrates the price of oil plotted by refinery utilization from 1970 to 1993.  During much 
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of this time OPEC attempted to restrict oil production to increase prices, which explains 
why lower utilization rates had higher prices.  The opposite is true from 1994 to 2004, as 
shown in figure 4-11.  While the p-values for the t-test for the last 11 years indicate a 
much less predictive variable, it is a good indication that the world’s ability to produce 
oil and oil products may be reaching a supply capacity constraint.  Tables 4-4 through 4-6 
display the correlation coefficients for all available years, pre-1993 and post-1993 
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Figure 4-10: Oil Price by Refinery   Figure 4-11: Oil Price by Refinery  
Utilization (pre-1993)    Utilization (Post-1993) 
 
 
Table 4-5:  Infrastructure and Exploration 







Price 1 0.7943 -0.7271 0.5347 -0.3618 
Wells 
Drilled 0.7932 1 -0.8061 0.3630 -0.2724 
Refinery 
Utilization -0.7271 -0.8061 1 -0.3685 0.3414 
Global Dist 
lag 1 0.5347 0.3630 -0.3685 1 -0.6573 
World Dist 





Table 4-6:  Pre-1993 Infrastructure and Exploration 







Price 1 0.8657 -0.8568 0.6681 -0.3865 
Wells 
Drilled 0.8657 1 -0.8338 0.5921 -0.3189 
Refinery 
Utilization -0.8568 -0.8338 1 -0.8341 0.4949 
Global Dist 
lag 1 0.6681 0.5921 -0.8341 1 -0.7098 
World Dist 
Diff -0.3865 -0.3189 0.4949 -0.7098 1 
 
 
Table 4-7:  Post-1993 Infrastructure and Exploration 







Price 1 0.6923 0.6036 0.7326 -0.3914 
Wells 
Drilled 0.6923 1 0.7661 0.6273 -0.4259 
Refinery 
Utilization 0.6036 0.7661 1 0.2854 -0.0920 
Global Dist 
lag 1 0.7326 0.6273 0.2854 1 -0.2565 
World Dist 
Diff -0.3914 -0.4259 -0.0920 -0.2565 1 
 
 
Current Events and Time 
 The price of oil has a strong correlation coefficient with all the variables tested.  
The variable for supply constraint was added because the correlation between a 
restrictive OPEC pricing policy and the binomial variable for war is rather large.  In 
essence it is a binomial variable with a 1 representing an event restricting the supply of 
crude oil.  Further evaluation of the constant oil policy indicates that it is very predictive 




Table 4-8:  Current Events 





Price 1 -0.5088 0.6790 0.6675 0.8345 
Const oil Policy -0.5088 1 -0.3520 -0.4865 -0.3520 
OPEC Restrict 0.6790 -0.3520 1 0.5039 0.6028 
War 0.6675 -0.4865 0.5039 1 0.7235 
Supply Capacity 
Constraint 0.8345 -0.3520 0.6028 0.7235 1 
 
   
Time 
 Like the binomial variable for constant oil price, the year has very poor 
correlation with the price of oil after 1973.  As a result, it is not considered further. 
 
Table 4-9:  Time 
 Price Year 
Price 1 0.3932 
Year 0.3932 1 
       
Best Predictors 
The nine variables with the best correlation coefficient are displayed in table 4-10.  The 
top three predictors all have a correlation coefficient of greater than 0.8 while the 





















Price 1 0.8336 -0.6856 0.6506 0.6790 0.6675 0.8153 0.8194 0.7943 0.6594 
GDP Deflator 0.8336 1 -0.7083 0.4840 0.5939 0.5369 0.5400 0.8342 0.6260 0.5626 
Residential 
Lag 2  -0.6856 -0.7083 1 -0.2960 -0.4647 -0.3587 -0.4372 -0.6409 -0.4831 -0.3830 
SOR  lag 2 0.6506 0.4840 -0.2960 1 0.5772 0.5354 0.5458 0.5793 0.5991 0.5941 
OPEC 
Restriction 0.6790 0.5939 -0.4647 0.5772 1 0.5039 0.5179 0.6971 0.6521 0.5736 




0.8153 0.5400 -0.4372 0.5458 0.5179 0.6144 1 0.5593 0.6014 0.4890 
ARMA 3, 1 0.8194 0.8342 -0.6409 0.5793 0.6971 0.5965 0.5593 1 0.8288 0.8620 
Wells Drilled 0.7943 0.6260 -0.4831 0.5991 0.6521 0.4511 0.6014 0.8288 1 0.8711 
Wells Drilled 
Lag 1 
0.6594 0.5626 -0.3830 0.5941 0.5736 0.4950 0.4890 0.8620 0.8711 1 
 
Structural Forecasting Models 
  Two structural models were built for this thesis, one using an ARMA forecast 
and one using the number of wells drilled in the US.  Both of these variables have good 
correlation coefficients with the price of oil and each other.  The ARMA model performs 
better, but the model incorporating the number of wells drilled has other advantages.  
ARMA Structural Model  
 A regression model using the ARMA (3, 1) described earlier in this chapter, a 
variable representing a capacity constraint restriction, and the first order difference of the 
GDP Deflator was built.  Only data after 1973 was considered for this model because 
prior to that time the variance in the price of oil was very low, and displayed a strong 
negative trend.  In 1973, OPEC managed to effectively manipulate the price of oil for the 
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first time, and since that time the oil market has been very volatile (Cremer, 1991).  
Figure 3-2 displays the real price of oil from 1950 to 2004.  Attempts to forecast using 
this data resulted in better R2 values but were less effective at forecasting over the hold-

















 Figure 4-12: Crude Oil Prices 1950 – 2004 
 
The model developed is expressed as tF θ β= + (ARMA 3, 1) β+ (GDP 
Deflator) β+ ( Restricted Supply).  Table 4-11 displays the coefficients as well as the 
standard error and t-test results.   
 
 
Table 4-11: ARMA Structural Model Coefficients 
Term  Estimate Std Error t Ratio p-value 
Intercept   6.7708 2.5134 2.6900 0.0144 
GDP Deflator   3.6694 0.6957 5.2700 <.0001 
ARMA 3, 1   0.1905 0.0996 1.9100 0.0709 




The adjusted R2 and f-test are presented in table 4- 12.  Given the results of the t test and 
f-test coupled with extremely high R2, we can conclude that this model is capable of 
predicting oil prices.  
Table 4-12: ARMA Structural Model Results 
R2 0.954615 
Adjusted R2 0.946606 
F Ratio 119.1923 
p-value <0.0001 
Observations  21 
 
 The GDP Deflator provides feedback on the rate of economic growth.  Higher 
economic growth rates translate to higher demand for petroleum, and petroleum-based 
products.  It can also be argued that increasing petroleum prices will cause an increase in 
prices throughout a modern economy because it is systemic to production of virtually all 
good and services.  In that way it also gives an indication of the supply of oil with tighter 
supplies bringing higher prices.  The price path for crude oil is like a pendulum, moving 
from disequilibrium to equilibrium and eventually over-correcting to another state of 
disequilibrium.  The ARMA 3, 1 provides the basic price path moves through these 
cycles, seeking a steady state.  Finally, the supply constraint identifies times where the 
production and distribution of crude oil is constrained for some reason.  In 1980, it was 
OPEC cutting production dramatically in an effort to raise the price of oil, coupled with a 
war in the region.  The more recent constraint is due to higher marginal cost for OPEC 
production and the high refinery capacity utilization rates.   
  The model was tested against the three major assumptions of regression: 
normality, independence, and constant variance of the residuals.  The results were 
consistent with the assumptions and are located in Appendix 1.   
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Wells Drilled Structural Model 
 Because the correlation coefficient between the ARMA 3,1 model and the number 
of wells drilled in the US lagged one period is high,  a model was built substituting those 
variables.  Only data after 1973 was considered.  The forecast model is expressed as 
tF θ β= + (US Wells Drilled) β+ (GDP Deflator) β+ ( Restricted Supply).  Table 4-13 
displays the coefficients as well as the standard error and t-test results. 
Table 4-13:  Wells Drilled Structural Coefficients 
Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio p-value 
Intercept  5.3120 3.5169 1.51 0.1504 
DFLTR Diff   4.1880 0.7930 5.28 <0.0001 
Supply Constraint  15.3603 2.6288 5.84 <0.0001 
Wells Drilled Lag 1  0.0000214 0.000012 1.72 0.1039 
 
 While the t-test results for the number of wells drilled lagged greater than the 0.10 
cut-off described in chapter 3, it has been accepted.  The results were very close to the 
threshold and the model much more predictive with this variable.  The adjusted R2 and f-
test are presented in table 4-14.  This model is nearly as good as the ARMA structural 
model described earlier, but the p-values for the intercept and wells drilled do not 
indicate as strong a model.  But it has other advantages and the coefficients for both 
models are very similar for both models.  As a result, this is likely a viable model as well. 
Table 4-14: Wells Drilled Structural Model Results 
R2 0.9514 
Adjusted R2 0.9422 




The number of wells drilled in the US, like the ARMA (3, 1) model provides a 
basic price path, but it also provides some insight as to why.  As the price of oil increases 
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the number of wells also increases.  Eventually the growth in production exceeds the 
growth in demand and oil prices fall.  When prices eventually reach a trough, production 
growth no longer keeps up with demand growth and the cycle begins again.   
 The three assumptions for regression were tested and this model passed these tests 
as well.  The results are presented in Appendix 1. 
Forecast model results 
A forecast of the difference of the GDP deflator from 1994 to 2004 was used to forecast oil prices 
from 1994 to 2004 (Smirnoff, 2006).  There are several GDP deflator forecasts available to forecast for the 
years after 2004 including one from the EIA or from commercial sources like Global Insight.  To forecast 
beyond 2004, the EIA forecasted GDP chained-type price index from the 2006 AEO early release will be 
used. 
The supply capacity constraint variable for the years 2000 through 2003 used a 0.5 and a 1 in 
2004.  OPEC re-achieved its previous record production rates (1976) in 2000.  This means increases in 
production after that will require a much greater investment than the years from 1976 to 1999.  As seen in 
figure 4-1, OPEC production dropped from 1979 to the mid 1980s.  After that time OPEC production rates 
have increased steadily.  OPEC production rates reasonably could have been forecasted to reach record 
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Figure 4-13: OPEC Production 
 
In 2004 the global refinery utilization rate exceeded 100 percent.  This was only the third time this 
has happened since 1970.  The first two occurrences happened during the 1970s, when the correlation 
between oil prices and refinery utilization had a negative correlation.  Figure 4-14 displays the global 
refinery utilization rate.  While the utilization dipped in the late 1990s and early in 2000s, the utilization 
seems to approach the logical limit of 1.  That is, as the utilization approaches 1, its approach slows.  
Because global utilization of refineries can be sustained above 100 percent this makes sense.  Therefore 
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 The models were then used to forecast the price of oil from 1994 to 2004 and the 
results compared to the known 1994 to 2004 prices as stated earlier in the chapter.  To 
determine the accuracy of the models the following error measurements were calculated:  
MSE, MAPE, ME and MPE.   For the purpose of this study all five measurements will be 
calculated.  But when comparing forecast, the measurements do not always agree, so the 
forecast with the best MAPE and MSE will be considered superior.   
ARMA Model Forecast 
Table 4-15 displays the price of crude oil, the independent variables and the 
forecasted price of crude oil using the reduced form model from 1994 to 2004 as well as 
the error measurements for each year.   
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Constraint  Forecast Error 
ABS 
Error PE APE error sq 
1994 14.61 2.0 14.9218 0.0000 16.9522 -2.3422 2.3422 -16.0315 16.0315 5.4859 
1995 15.87 2.2 14.2040 0.0000 17.5493 -1.6793 1.6793 -10.5819 10.5819 2.8202 
1996 19.67 2.8 13.7718 0.0000 19.6686 0.0014 0.0014 0.0069 0.0069 0.0000 
1997 18.06 2.6 13.5548 0.0000 18.8934 -0.8334 0.8334 -4.6148 4.6148 0.6946 
1998 11.27 2.2 13.5127 0.0000 17.4176 -6.1476 6.1476 -54.5488 54.5488 37.7936 
1999 15.9 2.0 13.6136 0.0000 16.7030 -0.8030 0.8030 -5.0503 5.0503 0.6448 
2000 26.72 2.2 13.8291 0.5000 25.2833 1.4367 1.4367 5.3768 5.3768 2.0640 
2001 21.33 2.8 14.1332 0.5000 27.5429 -6.2129 6.2129 -29.1275 29.1275 38.6001 
2002 21.63 3.0 14.5023 0.5000 28.3471 -6.7171 6.7171 -31.0545 31.0545 45.1193 
2003 26 2.1 14.9156 0.5000 25.1234 0.8766 0.8766 3.3717 3.3717 0.7685 
2004 33.97 2.1 15.3548 1.0000 33.0124 0.9576 0.9576 2.8189 2.8189 0.9169 
 
Wells Drilled Model Forecast 
Table 4-16 displays the results of the regression model over the holdout data set.   









Constraint Forecast Error 
ABS 
Error PE APE error sq 
1994 14.61 2.0 135118 0 16.5795 -1.9695 1.9695 -13.4807 13.4807 3.8790 
1995 15.87 2.2 124809 0 17.1965 -1.3265 1.3265 -8.3586 8.3586 1.7596 
1996 19.67 2.8 117832 0 19.5600 0.1100 0.1100 0.5592 0.5592 0.0121 
1997 18.06 2.6 129045 0 18.9624 -0.9024 0.9024 -4.9965 4.9965 0.8143 
1998 11.27 2.2 156661 0 17.8781 -6.6081 6.6081 -58.6348 58.6348 43.6676 
1999 15.9 2.0 143454 0 16.7579 -0.8579 0.8579 -5.3957 5.3957 0.7360 
2000 26.72 2.2 99410 0.5 24.3331 2.3869 2.3869 8.9329 8.9329 5.6972 
2001 21.33 2.8 141392 0.5 27.7443 -6.4143 6.4143 -30.0719 30.0719 41.1437 
2002 21.63 3.0 187616 0.5 29.5711 -7.9411 7.9411 -36.7135 36.7135 63.0616 
2003 26 2.1 138310 0.5 24.7468 1.2532 1.2532 4.8201 4.8201 1.5706 
2004 33.97 2.1 177074 1 33.2565 0.7135 0.7135 2.1004 2.1004 0.5091 
 
Annual Energy Outlook Forecast 
The 1993 EIA AEO forecast is presented in table 4-17.  Additionally the EIA 
forecasts from 1994 and earlier were compared to the actual price of oil by plotting the 
forecast and by calculating the first error measurements for the first 5 years of the 
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forecast.  Figure 4-15 displays the actual price of crude oil and the AEO forecast prices 
for the 1991 through 1994 forecasts.  To simplify the diagram, the x-axis begins in 1994.  
Not surprisingly, the forecasts get more accurate as the time horizon gets nearer.  But 
when the 1998 to 2001 forecast are evaluated, the forecasts seem to change the starting 
point and adjust to some predetermined future price.  Figure 4-16 shows this data.  Note 
the forecasted price for each of these forecasts converge around $25 in 2006 or 2007.  
Given that the price of crude oil will likely exceed $40/barrel in 2005 and the 2006 AEO 
Forecast exceeds $45/barrel it is unlikely that these forecasts will ever achieve any 
notable accuracy.  These trends can also be seen in the performance of the first 5 years 
for each forecast from 1991 to 2000.  Figure 4-17 shows the ME, MPE, MAPE, and MSE 
of the first 5 years for each forecast* from 1991 to 2000.   
Table 4-17:  1993 AEO Price Forecast 
Year Price Forecast Error Abs Error PE APE E2 
1994 14.61 20.77 -6.1627 6.1627 -42.1817 42.1817 37.9794 
1995 15.87 21.77 -5.9021 5.9021 -37.1904 37.1904 34.8349 
1996 19.67 22.64 -2.9705 2.9705 -15.1015 15.1015 8.8236 
1997 18.06 23.54 -5.4761 5.4761 -30.3216 30.3216 29.9874 
1998 11.27 24.52 -13.2471 13.2471 -117.5433 117.5433 175.4863
1999 15.90 25.69 -9.7872 9.7872 -61.5548 61.5548 95.7897 
2000 26.72 27.30 -0.5812 0.5812 -2.1752 2.1752 0.3378 
2001 21.33 28.92 -7.5924 7.5924 -35.5949 35.5949 57.6445 
2002 21.63 28.32 -6.6856 6.6856 -30.9087 30.9087 44.6966 
2003 26.00 29.54 -3.5403 3.5403 -13.6165 13.6165 12.5337 





















































































































Figure 4-17: Five Year Forecast Error 1991 to 2000 
 
1995 Dermot Gately Model. 
The global GDP, has reported by the EIA, has grown by a total of 40 percent 
since 1994.  During the same period, OPEC production has only grown by 17 percent.  
Given this output growth path, Gately defined three options:  optimal, reference, and 
pessimistic.  Figure 4-6 illustrates the actual price path of oil and the three forecasted 
trends in 2000 dollars per barrel.  The difference between three options is in the growth 
rate in Non-OPEC output.  The pessimistic option assumes that the Non-OPEC output 
will grow much faster than the reference case; with the optimal case the non-OPEC 
growth will be much slower than the reference case.   
The actual growth from 1994 for Global GDP, OPEC production Non-OPEC 
production and Global Production is shown in table 4-18.  Although world oil production 
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has already exceeded the 2010 forecasted rates for this scenario, it seems plausible that in 
2010 the price of crude oil could be between $34 and $51 per barrel.  Gately’s forecasted 
OPEC production growth is consistent with the reference and optimal cases of the 
scenario in which OPEC increases production exactly as fast as world income growth and 
the price is close to the optimal price path of that scenario as well.  Where this scenario 
falls apart is in the income growth and non-OPEC production growth.  It is plausible that 
OPEC intended to grow production as fast as the growth rate in the GDP, but miss judged 



































Figure 4-6: Gately Forecast 
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5 325.5 0.0440 589.62 0.0211 0.4801 1169.88 1.1070 0.6269 1.1070 
199
6 744.7 0.0953 1070.06 0.0377 0.3956 2336.65 0.9584 0.5628 0.9584 
199
7 1232.1 0.1484 2403.98 0.0809 0.5451 3222.84 1.0336 0.4885 1.0336 
199
8 1674.8 0.1915 3556.11 0.1152 0.6015 3573.66 1.0180 0.4165 1.0180 
199
9 2196.2 0.2370 2441.94 0.0820 0.3462 3861.80 0.7076 0.3613 0.7076 
200
0 2744.8 0.2796 4256.89 0.1348 0.4821 4953.26 0.8656 0.3835 0.8656 
200
1 3055.8 0.3017 3549.72 0.1150 0.3811 5616.09 0.7783 0.3972 0.7783 
200
2 3397.4 0.3245 1672.36 0.0577 0.1777 6698.77 0.6083 0.4306 0.6083 
200
3 3899 0.3554 3402.72 0.1107 0.3116 7683.29 0.7535 0.4419 0.7535 
200
4 4662.1 0.3973 5600.44 0.1701 0.4282 8888.24 0.8744 0.4463 0.8744 
 
Because Gately did not provide a year by year forecast of oil prices for any of the 
scenarios outlined, his forecast is not presented.  His forecast does support the reduced 
form and regression models though. 
Consensus Forecast 
 Because the AEO forecasted is more focused on the quantity of oil demanded and 
the effects of various policies on availability of oil supplies its price has not been 
historically accurate.  Further, it offers little complementary properties to the reduce form 
models created for this thesis, so it is not used in the in the consensus forecast.  While the 
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Gately models offer some potential, year by year forecasts are not available. Therefore 
only reduced form forecasts will be used to build a consensus model.   
The weights for the two structural models were calculated and are presented in 
table 4-20.  Because these forecasts were so similar the weights are nearly the same.  
When the consensus forecast was computed the resulting MAPE and MSE over the 
holdout set was inferior to that of the ARMA alone.  If suitable forecast had been 
available this forecast may have provided better forecast performance.  The consensus 
forecast is presented in table 4-19. 
Table 4-19: Consensus Weights 
 MAE 1/MAE Weight 
ARMA 1.8372 0.5443 0.5059 
Wells 1.8813 0.5316 0.4941 
 
Table 4-20:  Consensus Forecast  
Year Price Reduced Form Regression Consensus APE E2 
1994 14.61 16.7828 16.2804 16.53459 2.5719 2.4259 
1995 15.87 16.2430 16.5799 16.40945 12.3166 0.0001 
1996 19.67 16.8703 17.1969 17.03163 7.3197 18.6901 
1997 18.06 19.1604 19.5604 19.35801 1.5861 11.4915 
1998 11.27 18.3114 18.9627 18.6332 3.1739 2.5288 
1999 15.9 16.7063 17.8786 17.28549 53.3762 3.1252 
2000 26.72 15.9327 16.7583 16.34061 2.7711 5.3139 
2001 21.33 24.1774 24.3334 24.25449 9.2272 19.4576 
2002 21.63 26.6422 27.7447 27.18692 27.4586 4.1478 
2003 26 27.5273 29.5716 28.53735 31.9341 1.6465 
2004 33.97 24.0364 24.7471 24.38755 6.2017 1.8275 
  
 The error measurements for all the forecast are presented in table 4-21.  Note that 
the structural models created in this research outperform the others.  If year by year 
figures had been available for the Gately 1995 model it likely would have produce error 
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measurements similar to the structural models. Complete year by year forecast using the 
structural models for 2006 through 2030 are presented in Appendix 2. 
Table 4-21:  Forecast Performance 
Model ME MAE MPE MAPE MSE 
ARMA Structural Model -1.9512 2.5462 -12.6758 14.7803 12.2643 
Wells Structural Model -1.8101 2.5538 -11.8548 14.5893 13.5747 
Consensus Forecast -1.4330 2.4286 -9.9371 13.5499 11.2305 
AEO 1993 5.9342 5.9342 -34.2167 35.9994 46.2916 






Since 1973 oil prices have been very volatile.  This has given way to a great deal 
of speculation regarding the future availability of oil, and what price we will pay in the 
future.  It has also created a challenge for business leaders, politicians and even military 
leaders as they plan for the future.  The models provided in this paper offers a dramatic 
improvement in forecast accuracy over any forecast readily available to the DOD.   This 
should provide DOD leadership with a more accurate prediction of the future and aid 
with acquisitions, budgeting and hedging strategic fuel supplies. 
This chapter is outlined as follows:  first the investigative questions and research question 
will be reviewed, along with the results of those questions, followed by an exploration of 
possible areas to further this research.  
What forecasts have historically been most accurate at predicting fuel prices? 
 Since 1973 oil price forecasts have not performed well.  While the EIA forecasts 
have not been centered on forecasting oil prices, it is a critical component of their 
forecasts.  When the error of the first 5 years of these forecast are evaluated, one quickly 
becomes aware of the difficulty the world has faced since 1973.  These forecast have 
been most accurate when prices approach a trough in prices, and generally do not 
accurately trend future prices. 
 Other oil price forecasts have been made, but these most often are produced by 
private corporations using proprietary data.  Further, a year by year forecasted price is 
very difficult to find.  This makes it very difficult to compare the relative accuracy of 




What variables can be used in a reduced form forecast to improve forecast 
reliability? 
  By evaluating various variables, this research was able to identify several 
variables that had good correlation coefficients.  Unfortunately, not all these variables 
were useful in a structural model.  Some of the variables evaluated may become very 
useful in the future, but because the underlying structure of the market has shifted these 
variables would be counterproductive.  Perhaps the best example of this is global refinery 
utilization.   
 The variables representing oil consumption by sector is very interesting.  It seems 
to suggest that the long term elasticity of demand of residential and commercial use is 
greater than transportation or industrial sectors.   
 The GDP Deflators impact on the price of oil is also interesting.  The fact that the 
change in the deflator is lagged one year has the largest correlation coefficient indicates 
that last year’s economic growth influences this years price.  This is consistent with a 
demand shift. 
 The most significant finding is the supply capacity constraint.  This could be 
considered as evidence that Saudi Arabia’s reserves are running short or showing signs of 
fatigue, there is more evidence that it is the result slowing global production, particularly 
non-OPEC nations or because the infrastructure to extract, ship, refine and distribute oil 
is nearing full capacity.  OPEC production since 1993 has increased at a rate of 1.7 
percent per annum.  Further, since 2000 OPEC has averaged 1.6 percent per annum. 
When considered in light of Gately’s 2003 paper, it is likely that OPEC will continue to 
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grow at about this rate, through design or disaster.  This could prove to be a major 
challenge to the EIA assumption that OPEC will begin to produce large amounts of oil 
over that next several years. 
How can the most accurate forecast be combined into a consensus forecast? 
The lack of year by year forecasts greatly hinders the construction of a consensus 
Forecast.  This is very unfortunate because it limits the number of assumptions 
considered in the consensus forecast built in this research.  If reasonably accurate year by 
year forecast can be found a more robust model can be built, but as it stand now the 
consensus model built in this research is limited. 
Will a parsimonious and theoretically simple model out perform more heavily 
parameterized models?  
 The structural models developed in this research offer significantly better 
performance than the EIA forecasts, and are similar to the Gately forecasts that are much 
more complex.  While each of these models has unique challenges, they do outperform 
other models. 
How can the USAF better predict long-term fuel prices to enhance the 
transformation of the forces to face modern threats, improve financial planning and 
improve logistics planning?   
 The models created in this research are extremely tractable and offer accurate 
forecast.   They also rely on data that is available from the Department of Energy or other 
easily obtainable sources. The structural model built using an ARMA model proved to be 
the most accurate forecast, but it relies on an ARMA model.  This adds to the complexity 
 
56 
of the model.  On the other hand the model using the number of wells drilled lagged one 
year was nearly as accurate, and has the advantage that the forecast can be used to predict 
the number of wells drilled in the same year.  This prediction can then become an input 
for the next year’s forecasted oil price.  While the forecasted price cannot be the sole 
input to prediction of wells drilled, it offers a great deal of potential.  The EIA does not 
provide a forecast of the number of wells drilled, and if it did it would be based on the 
forecasted world oil price.  This means that before this model can fully be developed, a 
forecast of the number of wells drilled will need to be developed.     
Areas for Continued Research 
The number of wells drilled in the US is more than just a variable to forecast the 
price of oil.  It is also a barometer of supply infrastructure development, and can provide 
insight into the elasticity of supply.  As a result, this is an important area for future 
research. 
But US wells drilled are not the only infrastructure research that needs to be 
accomplished.  The ability to move oil from the well to market is a very important 
variable in the price of oil.  As such, the capacity to load and unload oil from tankers and 
the volume of those tankers could be a very important indicator of oil prices.  This 
parallels the need for further research into oil refinery capacity, though enough data for 
that research may not be available for a few years.   
The insights gleaned from the models built by Gately all provide some interesting 
insight into the world oil markets.  His 1995 elasticity model’s prediction of oil prices 
given an OPEC production growth rate of half as fast as world income growth are 
consistent with what has actually happened.  The error in the early years is due to a much 
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higher non-OPEC production that caused global production growth to exceed world 
income growth.  Further, the actual production growth rate for OPEC is very near the 
levels he predicted in 2001, 2 percent.  But a more accurate model may be to model 





 The residuals for the initial data set for both structural models were tested for 
Normality, independence and Homoscedasticity.  Normality was tested using the 
Shapiro-Wilk goodness of fit test.  Independence was tested by calculating the Durban-
Watson test statistic, and a visual inspection for any obvious problems.  
Homoscedasticity or constant variance was tested with the Breasche-Pagan test statistic.   
ARMA Structural Model 
The test results are presented in table A1-1, Figures A1-1 and A1-2 display the residuals 
by row and price respectively. 
Table A-1: ARMA Structural Model Test Results 
Test Test Statistic p-value 
Shapiro-Wilk 0.9642 0.6297 
Durban-Watson 3.0646 0.9874 
Breasche-Pagan 000000 0.0050 
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Figure A-2: ARMA Structural Model Price by Residuals 
 
Wells Drilled Structural Model 
The results of the test on the residuals from the structural model using the number of well 
drilled in the US are presented in Table A1-2, and Figures A1-3 and A1-4 are the 
residuals plotted by row and price respectively. 
Table A-2: Wells Drilled Structural Model Test Results 
Test Test Statistic p-value 
Shapiro-Wilk 0.9706 0.7033 
Durban-Watson 2.0891 0.3931 
Breasche-Pagan  0.1070 
 
A3 















0 5 10 15 20 25
Rows
 















-5 -2.5 0 2.5 5 7.5
Residual Price
 





Three tracks were used forecasted from 2005 to 2030: very tight supplies, tight supplies and limited constraint.  
All three tracks used the EIA’s forecasted GDP deflator, but supply capacity constraint was varied based on the 
track being forecasted.  The very tight supply began with a constraint variable of 1 and increased over five years 
to 1.5.  This track represents a dramatic reduction in the world’s ability to produce oil, such as Simmons’ 
hypothesis regarding the heath of the Saudi Arabian oil fields proving correct coupled with a slow development 
of alternate resources.  The tight supply track maintained a supply capacity constraint of 1 throughout the 
forecast.  This represents current world production growth at a about the same rate as world income.  Finally, if 
the world’s production picks up, it is possible for the capacity constraint to return to 0.5.  While it is 
conceivable that the world’s production could remove this constraint, most likely the constraint would return as 
the world production slowed under the waning prices that this would bring.  I believe the limited supply track is 
the most likely track.  Further this is consistent with the findings by Gately. 
 Table A2-1 displays the Forecasted prices the three tracks as well as the 2006 Annual Energy Outlook 
forecasted price and Gately’s forecasted price based on an OPEC growth rate of 1 and 2 percent.  Because I did 
not have access to a reliable forecast for the number of wells drilled in the US, I used an ARMA (4, 4).  The 
actual price for 2005 is the average of the price posted in the EIA’s Monthly Energy Review for January 2006 
for the months of January 2005 to November 2005.  Figures 2A-1 and 2A-2 compare the three tracks of each 





Table B-1:  Forecasted Prices 

























2003 28.37 24.79 24.79 24.79 27.04 27.04 27.04 28.46   
2004 37.06 36.19 36.19 36.19 39.48 39.48 39.48 35.99   
2005 48.65e 38.21 36.67 36.67 41.68 40.01 40.01 49.70   
2006  37.97 34.90 34.90 41.42 38.07 38.07 53.95   
2007  37.53 31.38 32.92 40.94 34.24 35.91 51.46   
2008  41.63 32.42 35.49 45.42 35.37 38.72 48.98   
2009  42.37 30.09 34.69 46.23 32.82 37.85 46.49   
2010  43.58 29.75 35.90 47.54 32.46 39.16 43.99 32.53 23.45 
2011  45.71 30.35 38.03 49.87 33.11 41.49 43.78   
2012  46.05 30.69 38.37 50.24 33.48 41.86 43.59   
2013  47.26 31.90 39.58 51.56 34.80 43.18 43.39   
2014  47.40 32.04 39.72 51.71 34.95 43.33 43.19   
2015  47.12 31.76 39.44 51.40 34.65 43.03 43.00   
2016  47.98 32.62 40.30 52.35 35.59 43.97 43.39   
2017  49.22 33.86 41.54 53.70 36.94 45.32 43.78   
2018  49.66 34.30 41.98 54.18 37.42 45.80 44.19   
2019  50.47 35.11 42.79 55.06 38.30 46.68 44.59   
2020  50.44 35.08 42.76 55.03 38.28 46.66 44.99 37.07 32.86 
2021  50.45 35.09 42.77 55.04 38.28 46.66 45.59   
2022  51.04 35.68 43.36 55.69 38.93 47.31 46.19   
2023  50.79 35.42 43.11 55.41 38.65 47.03 46.80   
2024  50.62 35.26 42.94 55.23 38.47 46.85 47.39   
2025  50.96 35.60 43.28 55.59 38.84 47.22 47.99   
2026  50.91 35.55 43.23 55.54 38.78 47.16 48.39   
2027  50.90 35.54 43.22 55.53 38.77 47.15 48.80   
2028  51.33 35.97 43.65 56.01 39.25 47.63 49.19   
2029  51.10 35.74 43.42 55.75 38.99 47.37 49.58   
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